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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
CURTIS C. BOSWORTH and
~
DOROTHY BOSWORTH,
-vs. _Plaintiffs and Respondents,
\

GEORGE I. NORMAN, JR.,
and ROBERT SHERMAN
d/b/a DOWNBEAT BROADCASTING,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case
No. 9518

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
The case evolves around the question of the necessity of a seller of real estate to divulge the existence of
a party wall of a buliding on the real estate to a purchaser.
3
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Second Judicial ·District Court (Judge Charles
G. Cowley) held the plaintiffs and respondents (seller)
entitled to specific performance of contract for the sale
and purchase of real property as against the defense of
fraud and misrepresentation for sellers' failure to disclose the existence of a party wall of the building situate
on the real property.
RELIEF SOUGHT
The relief sought on this appeal is as follows:
A.

Reversal of lower court's decision.

B.

Ruling of rescission of the contract.

C. Order directing judgment to be entered in favor
of defendants on counterclaim for damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs in this action purported to sell a certain
building and lot located at 2268 Washington Boulevard,
Ogden, Utah, to defendants under a certain" agreement"
(Exhibit A) (TRll) for a total purchase price of $30,000.
00. Defendants gave plaintiffs a check for $5,000.00 (Exhibit B) ( TRll) to be held in escrow until a title insurance policy was issued. The balance was to be paid at the
rate of $5,000.00 per year, plus interest. The title was to
be conveyed by "quit claim" deed. Also, in the "agreement'' was the following language: ''Buyers are assured
4
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by the sellers at the time of closing that all taxes, encumbrances, liens, or other possible indebtedness has been
paid in full and is (their) complete liability." (Exhibit A)
(TR11)
The defendant buyers later determined that the north
wall of the building was subject to a party wall agreement
(TR52) (Exhibit D-1) (TR33) and that there was a discrepancy as to ownership of the south one inch of the
property. As a result, defendant could not put the building to the use to which they had anticipated without prohibitive expense. (TR33, 34, 95, 96) As a result, defendants immediately notified plaintiffs that they could not
proceed with the" agreement" (TR54) as they could not
use the property for the purpose for which they were
purchasing it. In the meantime and before the title insurance policy had been issued (it never was), plaintiffs
attempted to cash defendants' check on which a stop payment order had been issued. ( TR25, 26)
Thereafter and by reason of defendants' inability
to remodel the building because of the party wall, defendants were unable to conduct their business to their loss
of $16,000.00 (TR56) in addition to architects' fees incurred in the sum of approximately $800.00. (TR36)
Never at any time did the plaintiffs inform defendants that in fact there was a party wall in existence.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION BY REASON OF PLAINTIFFS' FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THE PARTY WALL.
POINT II
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
FIND IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS ON DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM.
ARGUJ\fENT
POINT I
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION BY REASON OF PLAINTIFFS' FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THE PARTY WALL.
It is clear from the evidence and is undisputed that
the plaintiffs at no time disclosed to the defendants that
there was in existence a party wall on the building which
was the subject matter of the contract between the
parties. The law appears clear that by reason of plaintiffs' failure to so disclose concealed material facts, defendants are entitled to a rescission of the agreement and
the general law we quote as follows:
23 Am. Jur., Fraud and Deceit Sec. 50:
''Title, Ownership and Encumbrances. - The
general rule is well settled that false statements
or misrepresentations as to the title, or the char6
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acter of one's title, to real estate, made for the
purpose of inducing some business transaction or
dealing in connection therewith, constitute actionable fraud and may form the basis either for an
action in tort for damages or for rescission ... ''
''False statements and misrepresentations as to
the existence of liens and encumbrances on reality,
as to liens or encumbrances affecting the interest
of the representor, or as to the amount of such
lines or fraud. Thus, a representation that there
is no encumbrance upon real estate, if false to the
knowledge of the person making it, constitutes
actionable fraud if relied upon by the representee
to his injury.
"Likewise, a representation that the title to land
is perfect and free from encumbrances amounts to
an affirmation of fact insofar as any acts of the
party making it in respect of the title are concerned, and if false in respect of such acts, is
ground for rescission although innocently made.
''or the principle may be invoked that one who
negotiates for a transaction relating to real property is considered by most courts to be under a
legal duty to know and speak the truth as to his
title thereto and the encumbrances thereon, and
he is therefore liable for making false statements
as to such matters, although he believed his statements to be true, through forgetfulness that he
had previously sold the property or for any other
reason which rendered him innocent of intent to
deceive."
The underlying philosophy of all the law on this subject
is stated in 46 Am. Jur., Sales Sec. 98, where, speaking
of misrepresentations in business transactions such as
the one at hand, the text states:
7
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''The tendency of modern jurisprudence is to
bring the legal duties of persons engaged in commercial transactions up to the ethical standard of
conduct.''
And, in 23 Am. Jur., Fraud and Deceit Sec. 24, the law is
clearly stated to be that misrepresentations may be made
in any manner: by acts, words, etc. The conclusion of the
text is that "the mode of falsely representing a matter
of fact is immaterial".
The statements as to the law on misrepresentation
found in Am. Jur. are also found in Utah law relating to
contracts. In Mawhinney v. Jensen, 232 P. 2d 769, Justice
Wolfe, holding that the terms of a contract are not binding in a situation involving fraudulent representations,
stated:
"But where it may clearly be shown that the terms
used in the latter instrument did not correctly
embody the prior intention of the parties because
of inadvertence, ambiguity or fraud, evidence as
to what was really intended by the terms of the
instrument or what was inadvertently omitted or
added may be shown by clear and convincing evidence. " (at page 77 4)
He also recited the general rule as to parol evidence in
such situations: (Page 775)
"We also point out that parol evidence is always
admissible to show fraud, even though it has the
effect of varying the terms of the written
contract.''
Furthermore, the defendants were justified in rely. ing on the sellers' representations, without being under
8
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a duty to first investigate the sellers' title. The law is
found in an extensive annotation in 33 A. L. R. 853, where
it states:
"One is not prevented from relying on another's
statement of his title to real estate as a basis for
contract, by the fact that the public records give
him access to such information.''
And in the annotated case of Loverin v. Kuhne, 94 Conn.
219, 108 Atl. 554 (1919) the court states:
''Every contracting party has an absolute right to
rely on the express statement of an existing fact,
the truth of which is known to the opposite party,
and unknown to him, as the basis of a mutual engagement; and he is under no obligation to investigate and verify statements, to the truth of which
the other party to the contract, with full means of
knowledge, has ... pledged his faith.''
The same rule is found in 23 Am. Jur., Fraud and Deceit
Sec. 167, where it states:
''Generally speaking, where one represents to
another in a business transaction that he is the
owner of certain property or that the property is
free from encumbrances, such representations may
be relied on without investigation, especially where
the representation is in a form calculated to prevent further inquiry.''
As previously stated, the policy of the law now is not
to blindly regard the technical definition of words used
in a contract as the sole criteria of interpretation or standard of the legal relation, but to look through the words
to ascertain the true intent of the parties. Hence, it is
9
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further submitted that even apart from the defense of
fraud based on misrepresentation, appellant defendants
should not be held to the technical wording of a contract
which clearly does not express the intention of the parties.
(A party certainly does not pay $30,000.00, a fair market
value for a quit claim deed.) This position is clearly upheld by Professor Williston in 3 Williston, Contracts Sec.
614, p. 1766 (1936), where he states:
"It is obvious that this preumption that parties
know the technical legal meaning of the language
which they use, and thereupon adopt that meaning,
may often be very artificial; and it is a reasonable
expectation and in accordance with the tendencies
of the law that the disposition of courts will be to
give language less and less frequently an artificial meaning at variance with the apparent intention of the parties.''
POINT II
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
FIND IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS ON DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM.
There is no evidence to the contrary that defendants
were damaged by reason of their inability to use the property for its intended use and there is no evidence to the
contrary that defendants were damaged in the sum of
$16,000.00. It is, therefore, contended that defendants
should be awarded judgment in that sum.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing argument and authorities, it
appears clear that this Court should reverse the decision
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and judgment of the District Court and should find the
issues in favor of the defendants and should direct the
lower Court to enter judgment in favor of the defendants
on their counter-claim against the plaintiffs.
Respectfully submitted,
KIPP AND CHARLIER
TEL CHARLIER
Attorneys for Defendants
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